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Abstract
We address intertemporal utility maximization under a general discount function
that nests the exponential discounting and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting cases as
particular specications. The suggested framework intends to capture one important
anomaly typically found when addressing the way agents discount the future, namely
the evidence pointing to the prevalence of decreasing impatience. The referred anom-
aly can be perceived as a bias relatively to what would be a benchmark exponential
discounting setting, and is modeled as such. The general discounting framework is used
to address a standard optimal growth model in discrete time. Transitional dynamics
and stability properties of the corresponding dynamic setup are studied. An extension
of the standard growth model to the case of habit persistence is also considered.
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1 Introduction
Typically, the benchmark utility maximization dynamic model takes a constant rate of time
discounting and, thus, intertemporal discounting is modeled as being exponential. This is
an analytically convenient assumption and it is logically consistent with the idea that a
constant interest rate is often used to compare the value of money over time, for instance
at the level of the evaluation of investment projects. However, there are psychological
e¤ects that must be taken into account when addressing intertemporal preferences. Such
e¤ects may have a huge impact on how we perceive the behavior of the representative agent
in the context of conventional economic models since they tend to generate a departure
relatively to exponential discounting.
In Xia (2011) three types of time preference anomalies that imply a deviation relatively
to the standard exponential discounting framework are identied. These relate to the
timing of the evaluation, the magnitude of the reward, and the sign of the reward. The
sign e¤ect was rst highlighted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and basically states that
gains are discounted more than losses. The magnitude e¤ect is a matter that has received
increasing attention on recent literature (see Noor, 2011 and Bialaszek and Ostaszewski,
2012) and relates to the evidence that there is an inverse relation between the amount of
the reward and the steepness of discounting over time, i.e., agents tend to be more patient
when larger rewards are under evaluation.
The most debated issue, though, is the one concerning changes on the degree of im-
patience as time elapses. This point relates essentially to the basic evidence that there is
decreasing impatience over time human beings tend to place much more weight on the
di¤erence between a reward to be received (or a cost to be incurred) today or tomorrow
than on the di¤erence between two consecutive dates in the far future. Thus, the rate of
discount that we apply when measuring the present value of some near in time outcome
is typically much larger than the discount rate applied to a distant in the future event.
This is also the same as saying that the discount rate decreases in time. Such type of phe-
nomenon is known as hyperbolic discounting and it has been widely discussed at various
levels in recent years.
The discussion on the subject, from an economic point of view, has started with Strotz
(1956) and Pollak (1968) and received inuential contributions in the 1990s, with the work,
among others, of Akerlof (1991), Laibson (1997, 1998) and ODonoghue and Rabin (1999).
These authors have raised some fundamental questions: Does the popularity of exponential
discounting come from its time consistency or from analytical tractability? How can
one incorporate into economic models an operational notion of decreasing impatience? If
preferences are truly present-biased, how does this relate to important behavioral issues as
self-control or procrastination? Are agents aware of their own intertemporal preferences,
so that they adopt sophisticated plans of action or does unawareness lead to a naive
interpretation about the future?
These interrogations continue today to be a rich source of debate on behavioral eco-
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nomics and related elds. Part of the debate is still centered on justifying why hyperbolic
discounting should be considered a rational way to form intertemporal preferences, more
than exponential discounting. Prelec (2004), Dimitri (2005), Drouhin (2009), Farmer and
Geanakoplos (2009), and Gollier (2010) argue that hyperbolic discounting is time consis-
tent and rational. Decreasing impatience in a stochastic environment allows for a formal
proof of such claim. Other authors are more skeptical about how hyperbolic discounting
is being approached in the literature. While there is a tendency to search for analytical
discount functions that may allow for an elegant treatment of economic models, one should
take into account arguments as the ones by Rubinstein (2003) and Rasmussen (2008) who
believe that modifying functional forms does not answer the main questions posed by
the apparent lack of rationality in economic behavior. As stated by Ariel Rubinstein, a
deeper understanding of intertemporal human decisions requires opening the black-box of
decision making more than changing slightly the structure of the model used to address
human behavior.
Other relevant contributions on the eld of hyperbolic discounting relate the generaliza-
tion of the concept and the exploitation of the corresponding implications. In Bleichrodt,
Rohde, and Wakker (2009) the commonly used discount functions are modied in order
to account for other kinds of time inconsistency on the formation of preferences besides
decreasing impatience. Specically, the proposed framework accommodates the possibil-
ities of increasing impatience and strongly decreasing impatience. Also Benhabib, Bisin,
and Schotter (2010) present a general version of the discount function, that contemplates
the most common specications of exponential and hyperbolic discounting found in the
literature.
The powerful notion of hyperbolic discounting, and its most common specication in
economics - Laibsons quasi-hyperbolic discounting concept - have been applied to study a
wide range of relevant economic issues. Just to cite a few, we highlight the contributions
of Gong, Smith, and Zou (2007), concerning consumption under uncertainty, Groom et
al. (2005), Dasgupta (2008), Gollier and Weitzman (2010), and Hepburn, Duncan, and
Papachristodoulou (2010) in the eld of environment policy, namely when making the
distinction between social and private discount rates, a paramount normative question in
this eld, Graham and Snower (2007) on short-run macroeconomics and ination dynam-
ics, and, Barro (1999) and Coury and Dave (2010) on the implications of non-exponential
discounting to economic growth.
In this paper we generalize the quasi-hyperbolic discounting setting and apply the
new framework of intertemporal preferences to a standard discrete time optimal growth
problem. The setup di¤ers from other approaches on the subject because we relate the
shape of the discount function to issues of nancial literacy, following the analysis on the
exponential growth bias as developed by Stango and Zinman (2009) and Almenberg and
Gerdes (2011). Our argument is that in the same way people tend to underestimate future
values of variables that grow at constant rates, individuals also tend to overestimate close
in time values (relatively to the ones more distant in the future) when discounting them to
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the present. This reasoning allows us to present a discount function that is exible enough
to characterize di¤erent degrees of hyperbolic discounting and to nest the exponential
discounting case as a possible limit outcome.
The proposed specication of intertemporal preferences is analytically convenient to
address a discrete time optimal growth model. It enables us to derive explicit stability
conditions and it serves to compare di¤erent degrees of deviation from the constant dis-
count rate benchmark. Additionally, we extend the model to include habit persistence in
consumption in order to demonstrate the exibility of the exponential discounting bias
concept when used in di¤erent settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail the
notion of exponential discounting bias relating it with nancial literacy issues. In section 3
this concept is applied to compare di¤erent possibilities in terms of hyperbolic discounting.
Section 4 approaches utility maximization under the general specication for intertemporal
preferences. Section 5 sets up the growth model and analyzes the underlying dynamics.
In section 6, an extension is explored; namely, the model is adapted in order to account
for habit persistence. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Anomalies in Financial Evaluation
Recently, Stango and Zinman (2009) and Almenberg and Gerdes (2011) have carefully
analyzed the evidence that points to a tendency to underestimate the future value of a
given variable that grows at a constant rate. This exponential growth bias clearly exists
in practice, for instance in what concerns household nancial decision making.
The mentioned literature emphasizes the link between the extent of the bias and the
degree of nancial literacy. A poor ability to perform basic calculations and the lack
of familiarity with elementary nancial concepts and products will, in principle, imply
a wider gap between individualscalculations and the true future values, i.e., there is a
negative correlation between nancial literacy and the exponential growth bias.
Well informed agents will be able to understand the basic notion of capitalization
and to perceive the exponential path followed by any value that accumulates over time.
However, many studies have been discovering serious aws on the understanding, by the
average citizen, of simple nancial concepts and mechanisms. This was highlighted by
Lusardi (2008) and Japelli (2010), among others. Financial literacy or, more precisely,
the lack of it, can explain the kind of deciency that consists in linearizing an exponential
series in time.
The important argument concerning the lack of ability on accurately addressing the
value of money in time is that incorrect answers are biased. As emphasized by Almenberg
and Gerdes (2011), individuals are almost twice as likely to underestimate the correct
amount than to overestimate it. Thus, on the aggregate it makes sense to state that in a
society where a given degree of nancial illiteracy exists, the future values of a series that
grows at a constant rate will be underestimated. Exponential growth bias will then be
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common when assessing the future value of an investment that o¤ers a return at a given
annual constant interest rate.
It is reasonable to conceive the existence of a link between the interest rate and the rate
of time preference. In Farmer and Geanakoplos (2009, pages 1,2), this link is explained in
simple terms,
A natural justication for exponential discounting comes from nancial economics
and the opportunity cost of foregoing an investment. A dollar at time s can be placed in
the bank to collect interest at rate r, and if the interest rate is constant, it will generate
exp(r(t  s)) dollars at time t. A dollar at time t is therefore equivalent to exp( r(t  s))
dollars at time s. Letting  = t   s, this motivates the exponential discount function
Ds() = D() = exp( r), independent of s.
The above sentence establishes a possible direct connection between the interest rate
and the discount rate of intertemporal preferences. Nevertheless, there is a substantial
di¤erence between the two. While the interest rate is obtained as a market outcome,
and might not vary if market conditions do not change, the rate of intertemporal choice
is a matter of perception and preferences. Agents may want to adopt a rate of time
preference that is close to the interest rate, but if they fail in understanding how future
values accumulate, the lack of nancial literacy eventually helps in explaining why the
subjective rate of time impatience possibly departs from a constant value or, in other
words, why discounting possibly deviates from the benchmark exponential case under a
constant discount rate.
To understand how nancial illiteracy might contribute to deviate agentspreferences
from exponential discounting, we just need to make the inverse path to the one that is
present in the evaluation of the exponential growth bias, i.e., if individuals tend to under-
estimate future values when assessing them in the present, they will certainly overestimate
current values when thinking about them as if they were taking decisions at some future
time moment. In analytical terms, the idea of exponential growth bias is commonly pre-
sented as FV = PV (1 + r)(1 )t, where FV is the future value, PV the present value, r
the interest rate, t is time and  2 (0; 1) measures the magnitude of the bias. If one wants
to address the present value given the future value, we just need to rearrange the previous
expression and write it as PV = FV=(1 + r)(1 )t.
The above relation implies decreasing impatience. Far in the future outcomes are much
less valued than the ones occurring in the near future. Now the bias works on the opposite
direction - near in time results are overestimated. We can call this e¤ect exponential
discounting bias, and we may dene it as the tendency to overestimate close in time
values of a variable that grows at a constant rate.
The exponential discounting bias will be bigger the larger is the extent of nancial
illiteracy and it constitutes an alternative explanation about why preferences in time tend
to imply hyperbolic discounting: agents want to select a constant rate of time preference,
namely a rate of time preference that follows the interest rate path, but their ability to
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undertake the proper computations is biased, in such a way that far in time values are less
considered than the ones near the current period.
Taking into consideration the notion of exponential discounting bias can be an ana-
lytically convenient way of approaching departures from strict exponential discounting.
According to the distinction introduced by ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) between naive
and sophisticated agents, the discussed bias puts us closer to the naive evaluation of
intertemporal preferences in Akerlof (1991) than to the sophisticated behavior that is im-
plicit in Laibsons (1997, 1998) analysis. In this context, a sophisticated person will know
exactly what the respective future selvespreferences will be, while naive individuals are
not able to realize that as time evolves, preferences will evolve as well.
As a result of the understanding that a bias on discounting cannot be perceived by the
agent, since it is the outcome of an anomaly on an otherwise intended constant discounting
behavior, the representative agent in the models of the following sections will display
a clearly naive behavior. Therefore, she will not be concerned with the possibility of
tomorrow selves choosing options that are di¤erent from the ones chosen today. Since
people are not aware of their own time inconsistency, it is legitimate to consider a dynamic
optimal control problem where the representative agent maximizes at a given date t = 0
her future utility, and thus to design an optimal plan where the present bias exists but
the agent acts as if it did not exist.
In short, the analysis in this paper nds support on two logical arguments:
First - Individuals desire to turn intertemporal preferences compatible with the oppor-
tunity cost of money. This is the benchmark time consistent behavior that the rational
agent would like to adopt;
Second - Lack of a solid nancial literacy eventually introduces a biased evaluation
of intertemporal preferences, that makes the representative agent to act as if she was an
exponential discounter, when in fact she is not.
3 Departures from Exponential Discounting
In order to account for decreasing impatience, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) have pro-
posed the following hyperbolic discount function: DH(t) = (1 + t) =, where  and 
are two positive parameters. This discount function implies a decreasing discount rate:
short-term discount rates are higher than long-term discount rates. Empirical evidence
suggests that this is a much more appropriate and realistic way to approach intertemporal
preferences then just considering a constant discount rate over time.
While empirically more suitable, hyperbolic discounting, considered as modeled above,
is much less tractable from an analytical point of view than exponential discounting. Be-
cause of this, Laibson (1997, 1998), based on a previous formalization by Phelps and
Pollak (1968), has proposed an approximation to hyperbolic discounting, that he dubbed
quasi-hyperbolic discounting; this is straightforward to apply to the standard dynamic
optimization models of economists. The discount function takes the following form:
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DQH(t) =
(
1 if t = sbbt s if t = s+ 1; s+ 2; ::: , with s the time period in which the future
is being evaluated; b 2 (0; 1), b 2 (0; 1). Note that in the limit case b = 1 we are back at
exponential discounting.
As in the hyperbolic case, the quasi-hyperbolic discount function captures the idea
that discount rates decline with the passage of time. Laibson proposes, in his studies, a
small exercise to compare discount rates on each of the settings. He considers exponential
discounting (b = 1;b = 0:97), quasi-hyperbolic discounting (b = 0:6;b = 0:99), and
hyperbolic discounting ( = 105;  = 5  103) and draws a graph where it is evident
that DQH(t) generates a time trajectory that is considerably closer to DH(t) than the one
originating in plain exponential discounting.
In the previous section, it was stated that the absence of a stable impatience level over
time may be interpreted as an anomaly, something similar to the tendency that individuals
have to linearize a series of values that accumulate at a constant rate (and, hence, truly
exhibit an exponential path). In the proposed setting, this anomaly should be considered
in the reverse way, i.e., if individuals tend to linearize exponential trajectories for the
future, when discounting values to the present they will exacerbate the exponential nature
of the series under analysis.
In this context, we will consider exponential discounting, DE(t) = t s,  2 (0; 1), but
we add the possibility of an error of evaluation that increases short-run impatience, gen-
erating a kind of hyperbolic discounting. Let (t) be the anomaly term, which transforms
DE(t) into a discount function with an exponential bias, i.e., DEB(t) = (1+(t))(t s).
Function (t) will take the following form: (t) =
(
0 if t = s
1
t s   0 if t = s+ 1; s+ 2; :::
.
The assumption of DEB(t) as the discount function has two advantages. On one hand,
it allows for an intuitive explanation on why we depart from exponential discounting.
There is an error of evaluation by the agents; perhaps they want to adopt a constant
discount rate but, relatively to the periods that are closer in time they do not have the
capacity to make an objective evaluation of their priorities. As time goes by, such ability
evolves and, in the long-run, the error in evaluation is much smaller. On the other hand, we
introduce a more general and exible approach to time discounting than the one underlying
DQH(t); as we will see below, the values of , 0, and 1 can be chosen in such a way that
we obtain an approximation to DH(t) that is undoubtedly better than the one provided
by quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
We consider 0 2 [0; 1] and 1  0. Naturally, exponential discounting holds for
0 = 1 = 0, while quasi-hyperbolic discounting is also a particular case of the more
general setting provided by DEB(t) for b = 1 and b = (1 0). Recover Laibsons
example and consider the following parameter values for the exponential bias discount
function:  = 0:97, 0 = 0:95, and 1 = 23. Figure 1 displays a graph that is similar to
the one in the original Laibsons analysis (50 periods are considered and hyperbolic and
quasi-hyperbolic discount functions are displayed; pure exponential discounting is ignored
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in the displayed gure). To this gure, we add the exponential bias case for the parameter
values that were chosen.
It is evident that the new function generates results that o¤er a much better t with
the hyperbolic discount function than the ones generated by the quasi-hyperbolic case.
After 15 periods there is almost a perfect match between DEB(t) and DH(t) (although,
if we introduced additional periods - after 50 - we would start to see a departure of one
of the series relatively to the other; nevertheless, this widening gap would never be as
pronounced as the one regarding quasi-hyperbolic discounting).
Figure 2 allows for a closer look on this issue. The gure represents the distance (in
percentage and in absolute value) between DEB(t) and DH(t) and between DQH(t) and
DH(t). Only in three of the 50 time periods (t = 1; t = 2 and t = 22), the distance between
DEB(t) and DH(t) exceeds the distance between DQH(t) and DH(t). It is notorious that
the present proposal is well suited to address decreasing impatience and it is also well
founded on the idea that agents lack the information, literacy, or ability to maintain a
constant discount rate over time.
*** Fig. 1, 2 ***
4 Exponential Discounting Bias in Intertemporal Utility Func-
tions
In many economic settings, discount functions are used to construct intertemporal utility
functions. Their typical presentation is as follows,
Us(c) = u(cs) +
1X
=1
D(t)u(cs+ ) (1)
Equation (1) represents the utility in the current period, t = s, from consuming today
and in all future moments from t = s+ 1 to an undened future date. The term u(cs) is
current consumption utility; the instantaneous utility function obeys conventional prop-
erties of continuity, smoothness, and concavity. Future utility is taken into account for
all possible time moments but discounting implies that a larger weight is put on closer in
time consumption opportunities. The discount function that we will consider is the one
involving the exponential bias, D(t) = DEB(t).
We can take the same sequence of utility functions, but now initiating one period later.
This becomes,
Us+1(c) = u(cs+1) +
1X
=1
D(t)u(cs+1+ ) (2)
Taking into account Us(c) and Us+1(c) as presented above, we can address intertem-
poral utility under a recursive form. The following expression is straightforward to obtain
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from the simultaneous consideration of (1) and (2), under exponential discounting bias.
Now we denote time by t instead of s, in order to reect that the important issue is that
we are considering two consecutive time periods, independently of which the rst in fact
is:
Ut(c) = u(ct) + 
1 0
h
Ut+1(c)  (1  1)u(ct+1)
i
(3)
The above expression is analytically useful, because one can apply to it, directly,
dynamic programming techniques, in order to obtain optimal solutions.1 Consider a simple
budget constraint according to which a representative agent accumulates nancial wealth
(at) at a constant rate (r), besides receiving a constant labor income w. This constraint
is
at+1 = w + (1 + r)at   ct, a0 given. (4)
The problem the representative agent will want to solve consists in maximizing utility
subject to (4). It is crucial to remark, at this stage, that the intertemporal problem is
solved under the implied assumption that the representative agent is naive. As discussed in
section 2, we are not concerned with the tendency to procrastinate that an individual with
decreasing impatience might display, because she will never realize that her intertemporal
preferences are, in fact, not constant over time.
However, one must also highlight that the inability to understand how the future is
e¤ectively being discounted does not constitute an obstacle to the adoption of an optimal
behavior; the agent solves an optimality problem and chooses the consumption path that
best serves her purpose, which is the maximization of intertemporal utility. Putting it
in other words, besides the budget constraint, the agent also faces a literacy constraint
that a¤ects the evaluation of time discounting; given these two constraints, the agent acts
rationally by solving the dynamic optimization problem she faces. Financial illiteracy is
not an impediment to the adoption of an optimizing behavior, although it can change the
outcome of the problem at hand.
Solving the maximization problem requires dening a function V (at) such that
V (at) = max
c
n
u(ct) + 
1 0
h
V (at+1)  (1  1)u(ct+1)
io
(5)
The corresponding rst order conditions are
u0(ct) + 1 0 [V (at+1)]0
@V (at+1)
@ct
  1 0(1  1)u0(ct+1) = 0
) 1 0 [V (at+1)]0 = u0(ct)  1 0(1  1)u0(ct+1) (6)
1The dynamic programming procedure used to solve the model was adapted from Walde (2011), and it
is standard in terms of the analysis of deterministic discrete time optimization models.
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and
[V (at)]
0 = 1 0 [V (at+1)]0
@V (at+1)
@at
) [V (at)]0 = (1 + r)1 0 [V (at+1)]0 (7)
We must also take into account the transversality condition
lim
t!1atDEB(t)V (at) = 0
Combining the two optimality conditions, (6) and (7), one obtains an equation of mo-
tion for consumption. In order to simplify the analysis, take a logarithmic utility function,
u(c) = ln c. For this functional form, the following di¤erence equation is computed,
ct+1 =
1 0(1  1)(1 + r)ctct 1
(2  1 + r)ct 1   11 0 ct
(8)
Expression (8) might be rewritten considering as endogenous variable the ratio  t :=
ct=ct 1,
 t+1 =
1 0(1  1)(1 + r)
(2  1 + r)  1
1 0  t
(9)
From equation (9), we can determine the steady-state value of the ratio between two
consecutive values of consumption.
Proposition 1 The typical intertemporal optimization problem of the representative agent
under exponential discounting bias has two equilibrium points:   = 1 0(1 + r) _   =
1 0(1  1).
Proof. Solve (9), for   :=  t+1 =  t
The found values have direct correspondence in the exponential case with the solutions
  = (1 + r) _   = 0. Observe that the steady-state values are as much larger as the
wider is the discounting bias, meaning that the deviation from exponential discounting
promotes a faster steady-state growth of consumption. This is the obvious result of taking
a discount function with a corresponding steady-state value, 1 0 , that is a value higher
than the benchmark constant discount factor .
Note that the two solutions have a di¤erent nature: the rst one is unstable and the
second one is stable,
d t+1
d t

 =1 0 (1+r)
= 1+r
1 1 > 1;
d t+1
d t

 =1 0 (1 1 )
= 1 
1
1+r 2 (0; 1).
This is precisely a same stability outcome as the one achieved under exponential dis-
counting. Since consumption is a control variable, the representative agent has the possibil-
ity of selecting the unstable solution as the long-run path of consumption (it is the solution
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that allows for positive growth, namely if the rate of discount is lower than the interest
rate). Therefore, the long-run growth rate of consumption is     1 = 1 0(1 + r)   1;
the larger the value of 0, the more consumption will grow in the steady-state.
5 Exponential Discounting Bias in the Neoclassical Growth
Model
5.1 The Setup
We now characterize the dynamics of a neoclassical growth model under exponential dis-
counting bias. The maximization problem is the same as in the previous section (and
the same remarks on naive intertemporal preferences and on the ability to optimize even
under eventual nancial literacy aws continue to be valid). However, the constraint on
the problem di¤ers. We take capital accumulation and a production function involving
decreasing marginal returns. Let kt represent the capital stock and assume the following
parameters: A > 0 (technology index),  2 (0; 1) (depreciation rate),  2 (0; 1) (output-
capital elasticity). The resource constraint takes the form
kt+1 = Ak

t   ct + (1  )kt, k0 given (10)
Again, we compute rst order conditions to encounter an optimal dynamic relation for
consumption. If  = 1 (endogenous growth model with an AK production function), we
end up with exactly the same dynamics as in the previous section (with r = A ). Under
decreasing marginal returns, we will be able to nd constant steady-state values for both
the state and the control variable, i.e., kt and ct. Repeating the same procedure of calculus
to nd optimality conditions, we arrive to the di¤erence equation for consumption
ct+1 =
1 0(1  1)
h
1 + Ak
 (1 )
t   
i
ctct 1h
2  1 + Ak (1 )t   
i
ct 1   11 0 ct
(11)
Because one cannot address consumption dynamics independently of capital accumu-
lation on the present setting, we end up with a system of three di¤erence equations to be
analyzed; the system is,8>>>><>>>>:
kt+1 = Ak

t   ct + (1  )kt
ct+1 =
1 0 (1 1 )
h
1+Ak
 (1 )
t  
i
ctzth
2 1+Ak (1 )t  
i
zt  1
1 0 ct
zt+1 = ct
(12)
Next, we proceed to the full characterization of the dynamics of system (12). This
requires nding the steady-state and looking at local dynamics.
Proposition 2 The steady-state of the neoclassical optimal growth problem under expo-
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nential discounting bias corresponds to a unique equilibrium point:
(k; c) =
 
A
1=1 0   (1  )
1=(1 )
;A (k)   k
!
Proof. The steady-state is dened as the pair of values (k; c) such that kt+1 = kt
and ct+1 = ct = ct 1. Applying these conditions to system (12), it is straightforward to
determine the values in the proposition.
The steady-state value of the capital stock increases with the output-capital elasticity
and with the value of the technology index. It falls with a larger depreciation rate. It is also
straightforward to observe that a higher 0 (stronger deviation relatively to exponential
discounting) implies a larger long-run value for the capital stock; the same is true for the
value of . As for parameter 1, this has no inuence over the steady-state values of the
endogenous variables.
We illustrate the results with a small numerical example. Let  = 1=3, A = 1 and
 = 0:05. The steady-state for capital and consumption is explored for values of 0 in the
range 0 1 and values of  in the range 0:75 1. Figure 3 shows how the amounts of capital
and consumption vary with di¤erent values of the parameters that dene intertemporal
impatience. The higher is 0, the larger are the equilibrium values of the two variables; the
same occurs for a higher . The horizontal axis respects to , the depth axis represents
di¤erent values of 0 and the vertical axis gives the values of each of the variables for the
selected parameter values.
*** Fig. 3 ***
Although discounting is important in terms of the dynamics of the growth model, we
conclude that it has a limited impact on the steady-state: parameter 1 does not have
any inuence in long-run equilibrium, while a change on 0 disturbes the steady-state
slightly by making the discount factor value to change in the same direction. A larger
discount factor is synonymous of increased patience, which benets the economy in terms
of long-run accumulated capital and consumption levels.
5.2 Local Dynamics
In order to address stability properties, one needs to linearize the system in the vicinity
of the steady-state point. Computation leads to
264 kt+1   k

ct+1   c
zt+1   c
375 =
2664
1=1 0  1 0
j 1 + 1
1 0 (1 1 )   11 0 (1 1 )
0 1 0
3775 :
264 kt   k

ct   c
zt   c
375 (13)
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with j = 1
1 0
h
1
1 0 (1 1 )   1
i
1 


1  (1  )1 0 1  (1  (1  ))1 0 > 0.
Proposition 3 The system is saddle-path stable. There exists one stable dimension, in
the three dimensional space of the model.
Proof. The existence of one stable dimension implies that one of the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix locates inside the unit circle, while the other two fall outside the unit
circle. Let the eigenvalues be 1; 2; 3. We want to prove that j1j < 1, j2j > 1 and
j3j > 1.
We start by presenting trace, Tr, determinant, Det, and sum of principal minors, M ,
of the Jacobian matrix; these are:
Tr = 1 + 2 + 3 = 1=
1 0 + 1 + 1
1 0 (1 1 ) ;
Det = 123 =
1
(1 0)
2
(1 1 )
M = 12 + 13 + 23 = Tr +Det+ j   1
It is straightforward to observe that Tr > 3, Det > 1 and M > 3. The constraint on
the determinant implies that the eingenvalues are all positive or that 1 > 0; 2; 3 < 0.
In this second scenario, the conditions involving the trace and the sum of principal minors
imply 1 > 3   (2 + 3) and 1 < 3 232+3 ; these inequalities cannot be simultaneously
satised for the constraints on the values of the eigenvalues. Thus, the only feasible
possibility is the one under which the eigenvalues are all positive: 1; 2; 3 > 0. If
all the eigenvalues are larger than zero, then the constraints involving the trace and the
determinant allow to perceive that full stability (all eigenvalues below one) is not a possible
outcome. At least one eigenvalue must be larger than 1.
Next, we resort to Brooks (2004) to identify how many eigenvalues e¤ectively fall inside
the unit circle. According to the mentioned author, an evaluation of the characteristic
polynomial allows to state that: if condition
 (1 + M) < Tr +Det < 1 + M
is met, there exists one real eigenvalue 1 of magnitude less than 1 and either:
- a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues 2; 3 = a ib, with ja ibj < 1;
- two more real eigenvalues of magnitude less than 1; or
- a pair of real eigenvalues of magnitude greater than 1 and having the same sign.
Since we have remarked that at least one of the eigenvalues is larger than 1, the only
possibility that can hold from the three above is the last one. Thus, if the displayed double
inequality is satised, we conrm that 0 < 1 < 1 and 2; 3 > 1. It is straightforward to
verify the validity of the condition since it is equivalent to
 (Tr +Det+ j) < Tr +Det < Tr +Det+ j
Therefore, we conrm the existence of a single stable dimension, in the three dimen-
sional space of the assumed system
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The above result can be illustrated through a numerical example. Recover the bench-
mark values for the exponential discounting bias case, i.e.,  = 0:97; 0 = 0:95; 1 = 23.
For these, one computes the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix for various possibilities
in terms of the values of  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), namely, we consider  between 1=6
and 5=6 and  between 0:025 and 0:125. The values that the eigenvalues possess for each
combination of parameters are displayed in Figure 4. The gure involves three panels, one
for each eigenvalue. In the horizontal axis we have the values of , in the depth axis the
value of  and in the vertical axis the values assumed by each eigenvalue. Panel a respects
to 1 and the other two to the eigenvalues that fall outside the unit circle, independently
of the values of the parameters.
*** Fig. 4 ***
With saddle path stability, we have a result that is qualitatively similar to the one of
the original Ramsey model with a constant discount rate. There is convergence towards the
unique steady-state point, along a one-dimensional stable path; this trajectory is followed
because the representative agent has the possibility of adapting its initial consumption
level in order to place the system over the stable path, since consumption is a control
variable. The expression of the stable trajectory can be presented in general terms.
Proposition 4 Consider a point (k0; c0) in the vicinity of the steady-state (k; c). In
the convergence from the rst to the second point, contemporaneous values of consumption
and capital evolve following the stable path
ct   c =

1=1 0   1

(kt   k)
Proof. The saddle-path stable trajectory can be obtained by computing the eigenvec-
tor associated to the eigenvalue inside the unit circle. Thus, we can solve the system2664
1=1 0   1  1 0
j 1 + 1
1 0 (1 1 )   1   11 0 (1 1 )
0 1  1
3775
264 p1p2
p3
375 =
264 00
0
375
Letting p1 = 1, the eigenvector might be written as
P =
264 11=1 0   1
1=(1
1 0)  1
375
The slope of the contemporaneous relation between consumption and capital is given by
the ratio p2=p1, i.e., ct  c = (p2=p1) (kt k), which corresponds to the expression in the
proposition
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As in the original Ramsey model, the convergence relation between capital and con-
sumption is of positive sign; thus, values of both variables are likely to simultaneously
increase towards their long-term values. Note that this is a generic stable path expression
that can be applied to specic forms of the discount function, namely the quasi-hyperbolic
case and also the pure exponential discounting case. Observe, as well, that another stable
trajectory emerges from the analysis: one can also relate consumption at t   1 to the
capital stock at t. This convergence relation is also of positive sign.
Let us return to the numerical example. Take  = 1=3 and  = 0:05 and recover the
remaining parameter values of the benchmark exponential discounting bias exercise. The
eigenvalue inside the unit circle is, in this case, 1 = 0:944 14. The stable trajectory is,
then, ct   c = 5: 738 4 10 2(kt   k). For the assumed parameter values, in the conver-
gence towards the steady-state, when the capital stock increases by one unit, consumption
will increase 5: 738 410 2 units. This rate of convergence can be compared to the one of
the quasi-hyperbolic discounting setting. Recall that hyperbolic discounting was discussed
for b = 0:6;b = 0:99, with b = 1 and b = (1 0).
Continue to consider  = 0:97; to be in the conditions of the QHD case, we must
now take 0 = 0:67004 and 1 = 16: 771. For these parameter values, the lower than
1 eigenvalue comes 1 = 0:936 68 and the stable trajectory is now ct   c = 7:342 1 
10 2(kt   k). In the QHD case, the saddle path is steeper than in the EDB case. If we
take EDB as a closer approximation to pure hyperbolic discounting, one possible error
in using QHD consists in achieving a larger change in consumption as the capital stock
evolves than the one that should, in fact, be obtained.
Next, we consider the constant discount rate case. This is the case for which 0 and 1
are zero. As 1 approaches zero, the eigenvalue lower than 1 approaches 0:917 99. Thus,
the stable trajectory is ct   c = 0:11294(kt   k). This case departs even more from the
hyperbolic discounting case and thus the relation between k and c is even more steeper.
The above results point to the conclusion that the further we are from the exponential
discounting case the less consumption will vary, in the convergence towards the steady-
state, as the capital stock evolves. To emphasize this outcome, let us present the slope of
the stable trajectory for di¤erent values of 0 and 1. Consider, again,  = 1=3,  = 0:05,
 = 0:97. Figure 5 takes 1 in the horizontal axis and 0 in the depth axis, in order to
quantify the slope of the stable arm in the vertical axis. It is evident from the gure that
a larger bias relatively to exponential discounting (measured by higher values of 0 and
1) implies a smaller change in c relatively to k in the process of adjustment towards the
steady-state.
*** Fig. 5 ***
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6 Habit Persistence
In this section, we extend the discounting bias analysis to a setting where consumption
choices are subject to habit persistence. This extension serves the purpose of showing
that the adaptation of the standard intertemporal optimization model in order to include
the discounting bias is exible enough to approach other meaningful issues concerning the
analysis of utility dynamics.
Habit persistence is modeled through the consideration of the following utility func-
tion,2
u(ct; ct 1) = ln(ct   bct 1); b 2 [0; 1) (14)
According to (14), when b = 0, we have the conventional version of the model without
habit persistence; a positive b indicates that utility is directly dependent on how much
more the individual consumes today, relatively to consumption in the previous period. As
it is obvious, the larger the value of b the stronger is the habit persistence e¤ect. Constraint
ct > bct 1 must hold, in order to guarantee a feasible solution.
Consider the problem in section 4, relating utility maximization under the exponential
discounting bias, subject to resource constraint (4). Now, the problem takes the form
V (at) = max
c
n
u(ct; ct 1) + 1 0
h
V (at+1)  (1  1)u(ct+1; ct)
io
(15)
Following the same procedure for the computation of rst-order conditions as before,
one arrives to the dynamic equation of consumption,
ct+1 = bct +
1 0(1  1)(1 + r)
2 1+r
ct bct 1   11 0 (ct 1 bct 2)
(16)
which is equivalent to
 t+1 = b+
1 0(1  1)(1 + r)
2 1+r
 t b  
1
1 0(1 b= t 1)
1
 t
(17)
Proposition 5 The optimal control problem of the representative household under expo-
nential discounting bias and habit persistence has three steady-state points:   = 1 0(1+
r) _   = 1 0(1  1) _   = b.
Proof. By taking   :=  t+1 =  t, one transforms di¤erence equation (17) into
`1 ( 
)3   (`2 + b`1) ( )2 + (`3 + b`2)    b`3 = 0;
with `1 := 1=1 0 , `2 := 2  1 + r and `3 := 1 0(1  1)(1 + r):
2See Heer and Maussner (2005) for a more general presentation of the utility function with habit
persistence and corresponding analytical treatment.
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The solutions of the equation are   = `2
p
`22 4`1`3
2`1
_  = b, which correspond to the
ones in the proposition
Comparing with the problem without habit persistence, we have now an additional
solution,   = b, but the other two remain exactly the same. Again, the representative
agent chooses the path that opens the door for a possible positive steady-state growth rate
of consumption, i.e.,     1 = 1 0(1 + r)  1.
If we include the habit persistence feature in the growth model with capital accumula-
tion, the result is that, once more, this extension does not interfere with the steady-state
outcome and with the stability properties of the system. The steady-state continues to
correspond, as before, to a saddle-path stable equilibrium. Under habit persistence, sys-
tem (12), which characterized growth dynamics, takes now the form of a four-dimensional
set of relations, 8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
kt+1 = Ak

t   ct + (1  )kt
ct+1 = bct +
1 0 (1 1 )
h
1+Ak
 (1 )
t  
i
2 1+Ak (1 )t  
ct bzt  
1
1 0 (zt bvt)
zt+1 = ct
vt+1 = zt
(18)
In the steady-state, c := ct+1 = ct = zt = vt and k := kt+1 = kt. The evaluation of
(18) under the previous conditions leads to an exact same outcome as the one in proposition
2. Habit persistence does not change the unique equilibrium point towards which the
economy converges in the long-run.
Stability could be addressed as in the case b = 0. We present the linearized system,
in the steady-state vicinity, but we do not pursue a generic discussion on the signs of
the eigenvalues. Instead, we just characterize stability resorting to a small example. The
linearized system is:
266664
kt+1   k
ct+1   c
zt+1   c
vt+1   c
377775 =
266664
1=1 0  1 0 0
j(1  b) 1 + bj + b  bj(1 + b)  b bjb
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
377775 :
266664
kt   k
ct   c
zt   c
vt   c
377775 (19)
where j is the same combination of parameters as in section 5 and bj = 1
1 0 (1 1 ) .
Reconsider the numerical example of the previous sections ( = 0:97; 0 = 0:95; 1 =
23;  = 1=3, A = 1;  = 0:05). For these values, independently of the degree of habit
persistence (i.e., of the value of b), one nds, for the Jacobian matrix in (19), a pair of
eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Therefore, habit persistence does not change the stability
result previously found: saddle-path stability holds, what implies that the representative
agent will be able to control the consumption path in order to place the system on the
stable arm, through which the economy converges towards the steady-state.
17
Exponential Discounting Bias
7 Conclusion
People do not evaluate future outcomes as if they were computers or calculators. Mea-
suring the future value of some current event or the present value of some future event
is many times an intuitive process in which individuals engage. In the same way there is
evidence of an exponential growth bias, according to which individual agents tend to lin-
earize the sequence of accumulated future outcomes, we can conceive a kind of exponential
discounting bias, according to which we may explain the evidence that points to decreasing
impatience and that is analytically translated in the concept of hyperbolic discounting.
The notion of exponential discounting bias is more general than the one commonly
used by economists to characterize observed intertemporal preferences, i.e., the notion of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This allows for a exible analysis, where we can shape the
trajectory of the discount factor in the way we nd more reasonable in order to be as close
as possible to what evidence reveals.
Furthermore, the new specication has appealing features from an analytical tractabil-
ity point of view: because the bias originates on a misperception about how to evaluate the
future that does not introduce any kind of sophistication on individual behavior, i.e., any
kind of ability to understand that the perception of the future will change as time evolves,
the optimization model can be approached similarly to what is done in the exponential
discounting case.
When assessing the dynamics of an intertemporal representative consumer growth
model in discrete time, the exponential discounting bias assumption has allowed to con-
struct a three dimensional dynamic system, from which it is straightforward to analyze
steady-state properties and transitional dynamics. The analysis makes it possible to pro-
ceed with a thorough characterization of how di¤erent intertemporal preferences may shape
the optimal relation between capital accumulation and consumption.
The exponential discounting bias concept is adaptable to other features of the bench-
mark utility analysis. Specically, in this paper, one has explored the implications of
introducing habit persistence into the utility function; the conclusion is that steady-state
and stability results remain basically the same when the new assumption is taken into
consideration.
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Figures:  
 
 
Fig.1 – Discount factors for hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting and exponential discounting bias. 
 
 
Fig.2 – Comparison between hyperbolic discounting and the two 
approximations (quasi-hyperbolic discounting and exponential 
discounting bias). 
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Panel a – Capital stock steady-state value. 
 
 
Panel b – Consumption steady-state value. 
 
Fig. 3- Steady-state values of capital and consumption for different values 
of parameters β and θ0. 
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Fig.4 – Eigenvalues for different values of parameters η and δ 
(exponential discounting bias case). 
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Fig. 5- Slope of the stable trajectory for different values of parameters θ0 
and θ1. 
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